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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 2 Case No. 890465-CA 
v. : 
KEVIN NIELD, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary of a 
business, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202 (1978), in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in and 
for Millard County, State of Utah, the Honorable Cullen Y. 
Christensen, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENT ON APPEAL 
Defendant's issues on appeal are whether defendant's 
sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him was 
violated and whether the trial court properly denied defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence. 
Although defendant was convicted of theft, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978), a second degree felony pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(b)(i) (1978) (amended 1989), as well 
as burglary of a business, he has chosen to appeal only the 
burglary conviction. Judgment was entered in accordance with the 
two convictions on August 23, 1989 (R. 216-221). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defense, 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant, Kevin Jon Nield, was charged with burglary 
of a business and theft (R. 3, 4). Defendant filed a motion to 
suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant based on 
the belief that the warrant description of property to be seized 
was insufficiently particular (R. 30-32). The trial court denied 
defendant's motion, and defendant was convicted on both counts 
after a jury trial (R. 151-52). Defendant appeals only the 
burglary conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the evening of May 16, 1988, at approximately 9:30 
to 10:00 p.m., Gerald Freeman, the owner of Fillmore Diesel, 
Fillmore, Utah, received information that his business might be 
nuralarize *'~{ niob4 nc cabled ~V 
« , for an extra *.
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(R. 9). At 12:15 a.m. on May 18, Deputy Corry searched 
defendant's apartment and seized numerous items, including a pair 
of 18 inch bolt cutters, which were found in the clothes closet 
in the front room of the apartment (R. 12; S.H. 9, 20; T. 88, 
90). Defendant and co-defendant Richard Alvin Likes were then 
arrested and charged with burglary and theft. Mr. Freeman 
subsequently identified the bolt cutters as possibly his, since 
he was required by state law to have bolt cutters for his 
wreckers, and he had found an 18 inch set missing from one of his 
vehicles (S.H. 39-40; T. 129-30). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the bolt cutters, 
arguing that the warrant under which they were seized lacked the 
requisite particularity (R. 30-31). Af-':er a hearing on the 
motion to suppress, the trial court denied the motion. In doing 
so it issued extensive, specific findings of fact. The court 
found that Mr. Freeman maintained a shop filled with "all types 
of small and large tools including hand tools, power tools, air 
tools and equipment of all types" needed to repair heavy 
equipment and that on the night of the burglary he was able to 
point out "several more significant items of equipment . . . 
missing such as a mig welder and . . . [a] desk calculator but 
• . was not able to identify each specific item of tools [sic] 
because of the large inventory and numerous types" he kept (R. 
58-9). It found that Mr. Freeman could not tell specifically 
what was missing until he did a complete inventory and that in 
the meantime Mr. Freeman was informed that some of his "stuff" 
could be found in defendant's apartment (R. 59-60). The court 
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similar" to the tread on the footprints he photographed at 
Fillmore Diesel on the night of the burglary (T. 95). Also 
received into evidence were a sander, two jack stands and a mig 
welder, found in a box underneath a pile of "junk" in the shed 
behind defendant's apartment in October, 1988, and turned over to 
the sheriff on January 5, 1989 (T. 98-100, 243-49). Mr. Freeman 
positively identified the mig welder as his and testified that he 
believed the jack stands and sanders were also his because they 
looked like his, they were found with the mig welder and his were 
still missing (T. 133-34). Angie Carpenter, an acquaintance of 
defendant, testified that defendant had told her prior to the 
burglary and theft that he was going to break into Gerald 
Freeman's shop and take what he could "get ahold [sic] of" to get 
even with him (T. 164-65). She further testified that on the 
morning after the burglary defendant told her he had broken into 
Mr. Freeman's shop and taken some equipment (T. 166-67). 
During the trial Deputy Corry testified concerning his 
interrogation of co-defendant Likes after his arrest. During the 
interrogation the co-defendant had confessed to the burglary and 
theft and, in doing so, had also implicated defendant. At trial, 
the co-defendant declined to testify, and Deputy Corry recounted 
the co-defendant's admission to him as it related to the co-
defendant's involvement in the burglary and theft (T. 222). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly admitted testimony concerning 
the co-defendant's confession as not being a violation of 
defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against 
him. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERIA ADMITTED TESTIMONY 
OF THE CO-DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION AS NOT BEING 
VIOLATIVE OF DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AGAINST HIM. 
Defena ,' esses 
:. .m ^c . .aranteeu * ix*n amendment * ' \ n;.:.ed 
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case. A review of the testimony in question and counsels' 
lengthy arguments that preceded its admission will clarify the 
factual posture of this case and dispose of defendant's sixth 
amendment argument. 
At trial the State sought to allow Deputy Scott Corry 
to testify concerning co-defendant Likes' confession, received 
during interrogation, that defendant and he had committed the 
crime in question. Although the co-defendant's confession was 
admissible against himself as an exception to the hearsay rule, 
all parties were concerned that the testimony would not "wash 
over" and implicate defendant (T. 182-196). In determining 
whether the co-defendant's confession could be admitted, the 
trial court reviewed both United States Supreme Court and Utah 
cases. 
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S, 123 (1968), a 
postal inspector testified at the defendant's and co-defendant's 
joint trial that the co-defendant had orally confessed to him 
that both the defendant and the co-defendant had committed the 
crime in question. The trial court allowed the inspector to 
testify and thus implicate both defendant and co-defendant but 
specifically instructed the jury to disregard the co-defendant's 
admission as it applied to the defendant. The United States 
Supreme Court, in reversing the defendant's conviction, held that 
"because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite 
instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating 
extrajudicial statement in determining [defendant's] guilt, 
admission of . . . [co-defendant's] confession in • . . [their] 
joint trial violated . . . [defendant's] right of cross-
examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment." I^d. at 126. 
In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), the United 
States Supreme Court fully discussed the narrow Bruton exception 
to the "almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors 
follow their instructions." Iji, at 206. There the Court stated 
that the narrow Bruton exception applied when the "facially 
incriminating confession of a nontestifying co-defendant [was] 
introduced at their joint trial." Ld. at 207 (emphasis added). 
In Bruton, the co-defendant's testimony both "expressly 
implicat[ed]" the defendant and was "powerfully incriminating." 
Id. at 208. In Richardson, the co-defendant's confession was 
redacted to omit all reference to the defendant, and the jury was 
instructed not to consider the co-defendant's confession against 
the defendant. In upholding the trial court's admission of the 
testimony with its limiting instruction, the Court emphasized the 
narrowness of the Bruton doctrine. It held that the 
"Confrontation Clause [was] not violated by the admission of a 
nontestifying co-defendant's confession with a proper limiting 
instruction when . . . the confession [was] redacted to eliminate 
not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her 
existence." I^d. at 211. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the Bruton and 
Richardson analysis of the sixth amendment right to 
confrontation. In State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987), the 
Utah Supreme Court interpreted Bruton and declined to apply it to 
the facts of that case. There, inconsistent statements made by 
co-defendants at the time of their arrest were admitted into 
evidence by the testimony of the arresting police officer. 
Because the statements did not rise to the level of directly 
implicating either defendant, the Court did not apply Bruton, 
stating that to invoke the Bruton doctrine, "a statement must be 
powerfully and facially incriminating with respect to the other 
defendant and must directly, rather than indirectly, implicate 
the complaining defendant in the commission of the crime." Ld. at 
190 (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207, 208 (1987)). 
In the instant case, the trial court properly limited 
the co-defendant's confession pursuant to Richardson. The 
pertinent portion of Officer Corry's testimony is as follows: 
Q. [State] What did Mr. Likes [co-defendant] 
tell you then during the interview, 
basically? 
A. [Deputy Corry] Mr. Likes [co-defendant] 
told me that he broke into Fillmore Diesel, 
that he used a set of bolt-cutters to cut the 
lock, and that he took several items from the 
business and placed them in an undisclosed 
location somewhere in the Fillmore area. 
(T. 222). 
No reference, either direct or indirect, was made to 
defendant. The statement neither powerfully nor facially 
incriminated defendant. Therefore, the Bruton doctrine is not 
applicable. 
In addition to limiting the testimony concerning the 
co-defendant's confession, the trial court here expressly 
instructed the jury as follows: 
In connection with the evidence that has been 
received in this case, ladies and gentlemen, 
there have [sic] been and offered a statement 
attributable to the defendant Likes, to him 
individually. You are instructed that 
whatever weight or credit you give to that 
statement is not to be considered in any way 
or fashion in your determination of whether 
or not the defendant Nield may be guilty or 
innocent. 
(T. 340-a). 
The trial court limited the scope of Officer Corry's 
testimony concerning the co-defendant's confession to permit no 
reference to defendant and specifically instructed the jury that 
evidence of the co-defendant's confession could be attributed 
only to the co-defendant. In doing so, the trial court properly 
applied the protective legal standards of Richardson. The 
admission of the testimony did not violate defendant's sixth 
amendment right to confront witnesses against him. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE 
EVIDENCE DEFENDANT CHALLENGES ON APPEAL. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress arguing that the warrant under which the bolt 
cutters were seized did not describe them with sufficient 
particularity. In reviewing the trial court's ruling, this Court 
applies the following standard: 
In considering the trial court's action 
in denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless the findings are clearly erroneous . . 
. . The trial judge is in the best position 
to assess the credibility and accuracy of the 
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . . 
However, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
we afford it no deference but apply a 
'correction of error' standard. . . . 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(citations omitted); See also Termunde v. Cook, No. 890495, slip 
op. at 2 (Utah Feb. 6, 1990). But see State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 
119, 122 (Utah 1983); State v. Galleqos, 716 P.2d 207, 208-09 
(Utah 1985); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1268-69 (Utah 1987) 
(which suqgest that the "clearly erroneous" standard applied to 
the trial court's factual evaluation and its legal conclusion). 
In the instant case defendant does not challenge the trial 
court's factual findings, as delineated in its ruling on 
defendant's motion to suppress and outlined supra. Therefore, 
this court need only assess the trial court's legal conclusion 
that the description of items to be seized in the warrant was 
constitutionally sufficient. 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires that search warrants particularly describe articles to 
be seized. However, an exact match between the property seized 
and the description in the warrant is not constitutionally 
required. In State v. Galleqos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The decision to seize must be judicial, 
as opposed to administrative, and the warrant 
must be sufficiently particular to guide the 
officer to the thing intended to be seized, 
thereby minimizing the danger of unwarranted 
invasion of privacy. Accordingly, the line 
between what is and what is not sufficiently 
particular must be drawn with a view to 
accomplishment of the constitutional purpose 
and necessarily varies with the circumstances 
and with the nature of the property to be 
seized. 
(footnote citations omitted). See also State v. Anderson 701 
P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1988) ("The adequacy of a description in a 
search warrant depends in every instance upon the particular 
facts of the case"); Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 557, 560 (Alaska 
1983) ("The requisite degree of particularity must be determined 
by the totality of the circumstances in each case."). In the 
instant case, Deputy Corry, acting on a tip concerning the 
whereabouts of stolen items and fearing that the items might be 
disposed of quickly, obtained a search warrant based on the most 
complete information he had available to him at the time (R. 7, 
60). A complete inventory of items missing was not available to 
him at the time of the search, and his reliance on the warrant in 
seizing the bolt cutters was justified. This conclusion is 
consistent with the language from a case cited with approval in 
Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 209 n.10: 
The amount of particularity required in 
naming the items to be seized for a given 
warrant to be valid will vary with the 
circumstances and with the ability of the 
complainants to be specific. 
People v. Harmon, 90 Ill.App.3d 753, 755, 46 111.Dec. 27, 29, 413 
N.E.2d 467, 469 (1980) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
Defendant's repeated assertion that the "shop 
equipment, air tools, mig welder, desk calculator, auto tools" 
warrant description is "generic," that is, applicable to an 
entire class of property, and his reliance on State v. Gallegos 
as being factually similar to the instant case are unjustified. 
In Gallegos the warrant ordered seizure of "all controlled 
substances and stolen property." There, the Utah Supreme Court, 
while holding that the description "stolen property" was 
insufficiently particular, stated that general descriptions could 
be held sufficient "[in cases] where attendant circumstances 
prevented a detailed description from being given." State v. 
Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 209, 210 (quoting Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 
at 561-62). Although the warrant description in the instant case 
is substantively more particular than in Gallegos, even if it 
could be termed "general," it would fall under the Namen 
exception just noted. The trial court's factual findings that 
the victim was not able to make an inventory until after the 
search and that Deputy Corry proceeded ~o obtain a search warrant 
with the best information he had are unchallenged by defendant 
and are dispositive of the issue. The trial court did not err in 
its legal conclusion denying defendant's motion to suppress. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that the search 
warrant description was open to challenge, the bolt cutters could 
have been seized validly under the plain view doctrine. As 
stated in State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986), seizure 
under the plain view doctrine requires that 1) the officer be 
lawfully present; 2) the evidence be in plain view; and 3) the 
evidence be clearly incriminating. The "clearly incriminating" 
standard requires an officer to have probable cause to believe 
that the item to be seized is evidence of a crime. Id., at 390. 
See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987); State v. Babbell, 
770 P.2d 987, 993 (Utah 1989). Here, Deputy Corry was present in 
defendant's apartment and searching the closet therein pursuant 
to a validly issued search warrant. The bolt cutters were in 
plain view in the closet and Deputy Corry had probable cause to 
believe them to be evidence of the crime. It was Deputy Corry 
who had first discovered the burglary of Fillmore Diesel and he 
knew that the chain link securing the doors of the shop had been 
cut. Bolt cutters capable of cutting chain link, whether or not 
they belonged to the victim, could be properly seized as evidence 
of the crime. 
Finally, even if this Court were to conclude that the 
bolt cutters were erroneously admitted as evidence, enough other 
evidence was admitted to sustain defendant's conviction, and the 
error would be harmless. Evidence of defendant's footprints on 
the shop floor found on the night of the burglary, stolen items 
recovered from the shop behind defendant's apartment, and 
testimony by Angie Carpenter that defendant told her he intended 
to break into Fillmore Diesel and that he had done so support 
defendant's conviction. No reasonable likelihood exists that 
without the admission of the bolt cutters there would have been a 
different result. See State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 129 (Utah 
1986) (citing State v. Hutchinson, 655 ?.2d 635 (Utah 1982); Utah 
R. Evid. 103(a), Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a)). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this <* *> day of February, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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